Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Pat White v. Paul Blackburn : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Unknown .
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, White v. Blackburn, No. 890408 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2009

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

,-v
KIRTON, McCONKIE & B U S H N E L L
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
W I L F O R D W. KIRTON, J R .
OSCAR W. McCONKIE
DAN S. B U S H N E L L
RICHARD R. BOYLE
RAYMOND W. GEE
ALLEN M. SWAN
B. LLOYD POELMAN
GRAHAM DODD
ANTHONY I. BENTLEY, J R .
J D O U G L A S MITCHELL
R I C H A R D R. NESLEN
HENRY D. STAGG
MYRON L. S O R E N S E N
R A E B U R N G. KENNARD
J E R R Y W. OEARINGER
RAYMOND L. RIDGE

V

R O B E R T P. L U N f i M l E r
B R I N T O N R. B U R B I D G E

^ p !

GREGORY S. BELL
LEE F O R D H U N T E R
LARRY R. WHITE
WILLIAM H. WINGO
J A M E S E. G L E A S O N
DAVID M. McCONKIE
R E A D R. HELLEWELL
ROLF H. BERGER
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, II
LORIN C. BARKER
DAVID M. WAHLOUIST
J A M E S J . CASSITY
WALLACE O F E L S T E D
MERRILL F. N E L S O N
DAVJD B. ERICKSON
D. E S S I G
D. DRAPER
BLAKE T. O S T L E R
D A N I F L T. DITTO
S H E R E N E T. D I L L O N
DANIEL BAY G I B B O N S

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
3 3 0 SOUTH THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*111-2599

flLEu
OEC

T E L E P H O N E (SOI) 521 3 6 8 0
TELECOPIER (801) 321 4 8 9 3
TELEX 3 8 8 3 8 5 K M B LAWYERS

B1988

220^39-

Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah

OF C O U N S E L
H A R O L D R. BOYER
DAVID P, F A R N S W O R T H
WILLIAM R. S H E F F I E L D *
R I C H A R D G. J O H N S O N , JR.*
*NOT ADMITTED IN UTAH

UTAH
DOCUMENT
December 5, 1988

50
>urt of Utah
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Or*

White v. Blackburn, et al
No. 88-0233

^
"*»y %Jf

Gentlemen:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DEPUTY

WALTER J. NALLY et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants#
v.

S002882

GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH OF THE
VALLEY et al.,

(Ct. of Appeal
No. B015721)

Defendants and Respondents.

I.

(Super. Ct.
No. NCC18668B)

INTRODUCTION

On April 1, 1979, 24-year-old Kenneth Nally
(hereafter Nally) committed suicide by shooting himself in the
head with a shotgun.

His parents (hereafter plaintiffs) filed

a wrongful death action against Grace Community Church of the
Valley (hereafter Church), a Protestant Christian congregation
located in Sun Valley, California, and four Church pastors:
MacArthur, Thomson, Cory and Rea (hereafter collectively
referred to as defendants), alleging •'clergyman malpractice,"
i.e., negligence and outrageous conduct in failing to prevent
the suicide.

(See Code Civ. Proc, § 377.)

Nally, a member

of the Church since 1974, had participated in defendants1
pastoral counseling programs prior to his death.
SEE CONCURRING OPINION

1

This case was previously before us in 1984 after the
Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for defendants and
remanded to the trial court (hereafter Nally I).

After we

denied a hearing and depublished the Nally I Court of Appeal
opinion, the matter was sent back to the trial court.

At the

close of plaintiffs* evidence at the trial on remand, the
court granted defendants1 motion for nonsuit on all counts on
the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.-^
The Court of Appeal again reversed and we granted
review to address:

(i) whether we should impose a duty on

defendants and other "nontherapist counselors" (i.e., persons
other than licensed psychotherapists, who counsel others
concerning their emotional and spiritual problems) to refer
persons to licensed mental health professionals once suicide
becomes a foreseeable risk, and (ii) whether the evidence
presented at trial supports plaintiffs* cause of action for
wrongful death based on defendants* alleged "intentional
infliction of emotional distress" on Nally.

•1' Code of Civil Procedure section 581c provides in relevant
part: "(a) After the plaintiff has completed his or her
opening statement, or the presentation of his or her evidence
in a trial by jury, the defendant, without waiving his right
to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a judgment of nonsuit. . . . [If] (c) If the motion
is granted, unless the court in its order for judgment
otherwise specifies, the judgment of nonsuit operates as an
adjudication upon the merits."
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II.
A.

FACTS

Background
In 1973, while attending University of California at

Los Angeles (hereafter UCLA), Nally became depressed after
breaking up with his girlfriend.

He often talked about the

absurdity of life, the problems he had with women and his
family, and he occasionally mentioned suicide to his friends.
Though Nally had been raised in a Roman Catholic household, he
converted to Protestantism while he was a student at UCLA, and
in 1974 he began attending the Church, the largest Protestant
church in Los Angeles County.

Nally*s conversion became a

source of controversy between him and his family.

During this

time, Nally developed a close friendship with defendant Pastor
Cory, who was responsible for overseeing the ministry to the
collegians attending the Church.

On occasion, Nally discussed

his problems with Cory, but the two never established a formal
counseling relationship.

Between 1974 and 1979, Nally was

active in defendants1 various Church programs and ministries.
Defendants offered pastoral counseling to church
members in matters of faith, doctrine and the application of
Christian principles.

During 1979, defendant Church had

approximately 30 counselors on its staff, serving a
congregation of more than 10,000 persons.

Defendants taught

that the Bible is the fundamental Word of God containing
truths that must govern Christians in their relationship with
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God and the world at large, and in their own personal lives.
Defendant Church had no professional or clinical counseling
ministry, and its pastoral counseling was essentially religious in nature.

Such counseling was often received through

instruction, study, prayer and guidance, ami Ihrough mentoring
relationships called "discipleships."

According to the trial

testimony of defendant Senior Pastor MacArthur, "Grace
Community Church does not have a professional 01 clinical
counseling ministry.
such.

We don't ruii a counseling center as

We aren't paid for that, and we don't solicit that.

We just respond as pastors, so what we do is on a spiritual
level, and a biblical level, or a prayer level . .

* in

essence, defendants held themselves out as pastoral counselors
able to deal with a variety of problems —

not as

professional, medical or psychiatric counselors.
In 1975, Nally was seeing a secular psychologist
to discuss problems he was having with his girlfriend

M" lei

graduating from UCLA in 1976, he spent one semester at Biola
College in La Mirada and was em oiled in the Talbot Theological
Seminary's extension on defendants' church grounds,

During

this time, Nally became involved in a relationship with a
girlfriend who was a fellow bible student.

In January 1978,

he established a "discipling relationship" with Pastor Red
with whom he often discussed girlfriend and family problems.
They met five times in early ] 978, but when Nally lost
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interest in "discipling," the meetings were discontinued.2/
Following the breakup with his girlfriend in
December 1978, Nally became increasingly despondent.

Pastor

Cory encouraged him to seek the counsel of either Pastor
Thomson or Rea.

The friendship with Cory and the five

discipling sessions with Rea in early 1978, constituted the
full extent of the "counseling" Nally received from defendants
before the spring of 1979.
In February 1979, Nally told his mother he could
not "cope."

She arranged for him to see Dr. Milestone, a

general practitioner, who prescribed Elavil, a strong antidepressant drug, to relieve his depression.

Milestone also

recommended Nally undergo a series of blood and chemical tests.
The record reveals that Milestone never referred Nally to a
psychiatrist.
By late February, Nally*s depression did not appear
to be subsiding, and he was examined by Dr. Oda, a physician,
who did not prescribe medication or refer Nally to a psychiatrist, but suggested he undergo a physical examination.
Shortly thereafter, Nally spoke briefly in a drop-in counseling session with Pastor Thomson about the marital tensions
between his parents and his problems with his current girl-

£/
Contrary to statements in Justice Kaufman's concurrence,
our review of the record reveals that Rea did not become aware
Nally could not cope in the physical sense until after his
suicide attempt. Indeed, the record, when viewed in context,
shows that when Nally told Pastor Rea that he "could not cope"
and just could not "live this life," he was referring to
leading the "Christian life."
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friend.

He told Thomson that he had considered suicide in

1974 while a student at UCLA.

The record shows that

Thomson's conversation with Nally focused on their common
faith in scripture.

During this time, Nally "decided to

serve the Lord through law," and was accepted at a Southern
California law school for the 1979 fall semester.
B.

The Events Preceding Nallv's Suicide
On March 11, 1979# Nally took an overdose of the

antidepressant prescribed by Dr. Milestone.

Plaintiffs found

him the following day and rushed him to a hospital. At the
hospital, Dr. Evelyn, Nally's attending physician, advised
plaintiffs that because their son "was actually suicidal,"
she could not authorize his release from the hospital until
he had seen a psychiatrist.

The record indicates that

plaintiffs, concerned about their friends* reactions to their
son's suicide attempt, asked Dr. Evelyn to inform other
persons that Nally had been hospitalized only for the
aspiration pneumonia he suffered after the drug overdose
rendered him unconscious.
On the afternoon of March 12, Pastors MacArthur and
Rea visited Nally at the hospital.

Nally, who was still

drowsy from the drug overdose, separately told both pastors

3/
Our review of the record reveals that although Thomson
recalled that Nally mentioned he had considered suicide while
a student at UCLA, and concluded there was a "vague
possibility" that Nally could consider suicide in the future,
he did not believe Nally's "intimation of suicide" gave rise
to a "serious enough likelihood where other help would be
needed at [that] point."
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that he was sorry he did not succeed in committing suicide.
Apparently, MacArthur and Rea assumed the entire hospital
staff was aware of Nally's unstable mental condition, and they
did not discuss Nally's death-wish comment with anyone else.
Four days later, Dr. Hall, a staff psychiatrist at
the hospital, examined Nally and recommended he commit himself
to a psychiatric hospital.

When both Nally and his father

expressed reluctance at the thought of formal commitment, Hall
agreed to release Nally for outpatient treatment, but warned
Nally's father that it would not be unusual for a suicidal
patient to repeat his suicide attempt.

Nally was released

from the hospital by Drs. Hall and Evelyn the next day.
On his release from the hospital on March 17, 1979,
Nally arranged to stay with Pastor MacArthur, because he did
not want to return home.

MacArthur encouraged Nally to keep

his appointments with Dr. Hall, and arranged for him to see
Dr. John Parker, a physician and Church deacon, for a physical
examination.

Parker's testimony reveals that Nally told him

he was depressed, had entertained thoughts of suicide, and had
recently taken an overdose of Elavil.

After examining Nally,

Parker believed he was a continuing threat to himself, and
recommended Nally commit himself to a psychiatric hospital.
Nally, however, immediately rejected the advice.
Parker testified that after Nally left his office,
he telephoned Glendale Adventist Hospital to determine whether
any beds were available.

He then informed Nally's father that
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Nally needed acute psychiatric care and that he should contact
Glendale Adventist Hospital for information concerning the
psychiatric facilities.

That same evening, Nallyfs father

telephoned Dr. Hall and told him that Parker had recommended
psychiatric hospitalization.

Hall offered to come to the

Nally residence and arrange for Nally's involuntary
commitment; the offer was rejected by plaintiffs.

The record

shows that Mrs. Nally strongly opposed psychiatric
hospitalization for her son, saying, "no, that's a crazy
hospital.

He's not crazy."
Eleven days before his suicide, Nally met with

Pastor Thomson for spiritual counseling.

According to the

record, Nally asked Thomson whether Christians who commit
suicide would nonetheless be "saved."

Thomson referred Nally

to his training as a seminary student and acknowledged "a
person who is once saved is always saved," but told Nally that
"it would be wrong to be thinking in such terms."

Following

their discussion, Thomson made an appointment for Nally to see
Dr. Bullock for a physical examination but did not refer Nally
to a psychiatrist.
Several days later, Nally moved back home.

During

his final week of life, he was examined separately by Drs.
Bullock and Evelyn.

Dr. Bullock testified that he was

concerned with Nally's physical symptoms.

(Nally complained

of headaches and of the fact that his arm was paralyzed
because he had slept on it while he was unconscious following
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the Elavil overdose.)

Bullock suggested to Nally that S

admit himself to the hospital.

Hulluck, however, cl i

refer Nally to a psychiatrist; instead, he subsequently
conferred with Dr. Evelyn, and both doctors agreed Nally
needed further physical and possibly psyi "hi d\ i i c ev ii 1 ual i i urn .
The day after his visit with Bullock, Nally
encountered Pastor Thomson in the Church parking lot,

Nally

told Thomson that he was thinking of seeing «-« p.sychnioqist.
Thomson recommended Nally contact Dr. Mohline, Director of the
Rosemead Graduate School of Professional Psychology

The

following day, Nally spent approximately 9 0 minutes wilti
Mohline # who in turn referred him to the Fullerton
Psychologic^ J Clinic,

Nally and t i:i s father went to the clinic

the next day, and Nally discussed possible therapy with Mi.
Raup, a registered psychologist * ?< assistant
he believed that NalJy was ".

,, *g to

Raup testified

H therapist or

counselor or psychologist" and that he was not going to return
1

••* clinic.

At the end of the week, Nally met with a
She "

• • ,!l down an appaipnt marriage

proposal by telling Nally

can't marry you when you BTR

former girlfriend.

like this

You have got to pull yourself together.

got to put God first in yMii

lil< "

The nexl flay

plaintiffs' home following a family disagreement,

You have
*.« ly left
Fwo days

later, he was found in a friend's apartment, dead of a
self-inflicted gunshot wound.
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III.
A.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Allegations of the Complaint
As stated above, the Nally I Court of Appeal

reversed, in a published opinioi
defendants.

1

summary judgment for
f I he complaint,

alleging wrongful death based on "clergyman malpractice* and
negligence, plaintiffs asserted that defendant Church was
negligent in the 11:ai i :ii i ig, s e 1 e c t i o n a n d hii i:i i 1 g o f :i t s
spiritual counselors.

Plaintiffs also claimed that following

Nally"s suicide attempt by drug overdose, defendants failed to
make themselves avail a b 1 e t o N a 1 1 y f o r n HI n s c? 1 i ng and
"actively and affirmatively dissuaded and discouraged

[Nally]

from seeki ng further professional psychological and/or
psychiatric care,"
The third count incorporated the negligence
al leqat ion"' ly i cjf>i ence and charged defendants with
outrageous conduct for teaching certain Protestant

religious

doctrines that conflicted with Nally's Catholic upbringing and
which "n1 IIP rwi M» PI are i baf fiT* Nally's "pre-existing feelings
of guilt, anxiety and depression.'""""

(I n t h i s c o n t e 11 ,

plaintiffs claimed one of the defendants told Nally that his
temporarily pa r a .1 yzerl anii i;aused by his suicide attempt was
"God punishing him" for his sin )

P] aintiff.s also al 1 eyi/"il

that defendants' conduct in counseling Nally was outrageous
because the} "I aught oi otherwise imbued [Nally], whom they
knew to be depressed and having entertained suicidal tiioi igl its,
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with the notion that if he had accepted Jesus Christ as his
personal savior # [he] would still b e accepted into heaven if
he committed suicide."

Here, plaintiffs ii-lit'd oil Thomson's

statement to Nally 11 days before h i s suicide that one w h o is
saved is "always saved," and o n a short passage taken from a
12-part tape recorded series, entitled

"Ri cl" "Thomson:

Principles of Biblical Counseling/" t .ha1 w a s a recording <
Pastor Thomson's ] 980 classroom lectures to seminary
students.
The tape-recorded passage was recorded 1 8 months
after N a 3 1 y s s i 11 c :i d e a i :i d stated, i r I p e 11 i n e n t pa r 11

" A n d the

suicidal says, •I am under such tremendous pressure, n o w I've
got to have pleasure of release!
future!

T h a t",! s c h a r a c t e r I s t

N o w ! I don't care about the
*

.• :

characteristic of the suicidal that

• *-rf

*r

t judgment

that drives h i m into the death after which he will face that
judgment

if In ". i-iii unibf; I i pvei

find

allei

which, :i f he IF HI

b e l i e v e r , he Ml go to be with the Lord
B.

Procedural History
A i t e i i. o n s i d e r i n y t h f > a t in v i« e </ i ni * ; n e i.11 f tin*1 f; i i a L

court granted summary judgment

the basis that p l a i n t i f f s

had failed to raise a t r i a b l e issue of fact;
s t a t e d at. HIP lime of the m l i n q ,

The t r i a l court

"RMiqion lias nolliing I o h'\

with t h i s case."
Although the Court of Appeal an Nally I reversed the
summa ry j udgmen t

s ep a r a I *•> I y t:! i s r s s t In« f I i s I I wr»

11

c o u n t s alleging "clergyman m a l p r a c t i c e " and n e g l i g e n c e , but
iiisf eacl! focused on the third cause - * action for w r o n g f u l
d e a t h based

intentional inf l i e

en.'I noiial rl i st r i: sis

T h e court held the third c a u s e of a c t i o n w a s a d e q u a t e l y
pleaded ai id 1 ,i: iable issues of fact remained as to w h e t h e r
N a l l y ' s s u i c i d e was caused by defendants""' allnyedlv
conduct.
fathei

oul i ayccnhs

It based reversal on (i) a d e c l a r a t i o n of N a l l y ' s

t.hat after Nally's h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n in M a r c h 1979, he

opened Pastor C o r y ' s o f f i c e door during one of the p a s t o r i
c o u n s e l i n g s e s s i o n s w i t h N a l l y and found N a l l y on his knees
cryino ami <" i i I nn U I H dp pus i t 1 on testimony of P a s t o r
M a c A r t h u r that s p i r i t u a l counseling (such as he gave Nal ly)
could p o t e n t i a l l y c a u s e "the deepest d e p r e s s i o n . "
addition,

I ht> lumit

In

iir'licd on t ht« tape C X C I M j"t , quoted in part

a b o v e , as raising a r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e d e f e n d a n t s followed a
p o l i c y of c o u n s e l i n g suicidal p e r s o n s that s u i c i d e was an
a c c e p t a b l e a 1 tei jwit t vc in living

line Nal.ly 1 couit

rejected

d e f e n d a n t s ' First A m e n d m e n t d e f e n s e to the admissibility of
the tape •• • that the f i ee e x e r c i s e of religion c l a u s e forbids
imposing liabilifv mc-iely becnuse a ihijich tiachei

suii irli-

d o e s not lead to e t e r n a l d a m n a t i o n .
F o l l o w i n g the Court of A p p e a l ' s d e c i s i o n in N a l l y I,
de f end ant s petit i oned t h :i s c oi I i: t: £ o r r e v i ew
and d e p u b l i s h e d the o p i n i o n .

W e d e n i e d r ev i ew

The case w a s returned to the

f, i I a 1 con i I .
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At trial after remand, four experts testified fo^
plaintiffs regarding tin1 ij«iieicji vtai'danl nf rare to be
followed by the counseling community when dealing %
suicidal individual*

a

Each witness testified that although

standards varied among secular and d^nominational counselors/
a counselor has a duty to investigate the counseled persons
suicidal tei idencies and to encourage that person to seek
professional help once suicide becomes foreseeable

Although

plaintiffs attempted to show that defendants violated these
standards, tl le si iggested standards are vague and dependent on
the personal predilections of the i ndi v j tin a " cmrose J o i or
denomination, and not officially or formally adopted by any
organized body i.f cnunselcu
Plaintiffs introduced severa J counse I i ny manua 11:
that were apparently sold in the Church bookstore as
supporting an inference that defendants advertised that its
counselors were competent to treat a myriad of emotional
problems, and as evidence of defendants' inadequate training
as counselors.

The manual a, liowevoi, while advocating "If a

problem is not organically caused . . , the

4/ The trial court refused to allow a witness from the
American Pastoral Counseling Association to testify about the
standards of care imposed by the association on member
counselors. The court noted that defendants did not belong to
the association, and that the group had not been accepted by
the general pastoral counseling community as experts in the
field of pastoral counseling. In any event, the record fails
to indicate that defendants violated the foregoing unofficial
rules of conduct.
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w j" t 11 t 11 ] I jt f su i a m:e

In- > if f «» God • s Word for i t,s proper

solution," do not appear to have presented def end ant s at.
anything other than pastoral counselors.
11 i i1 ii 111 ig oi i t h e inonsuit m o t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
noted that Nally voluntarily sought defendants""! counsel and
that the court had no compelling reason to interfere in
defendants" pjsl trial ari ivi1ies.

The court stated:

"There is

r. compelling state interest to climb the wall of sepdidl , m
i,u.rch [and state] and plunge into the pit on the other
side that certainly lidd mi boiioin,"

The com it also found that

even if the law were? to impose a "duty to refer," as urged by
(i 1 d i ml i f f !•• the evidence failed as a matter of law to show a
breach of such duties cine,1 a l s v lailed

is a matter of law

Lo

prove that defendants 1 conduct was the proximate cause ot
Nail y •s death.

Moreover, the court excluded, under Evidence

Code section 352,5/ the tape -1ecorded excerpt fium Pastor
Thomson's lecture series that Nally I had deemed essential to
sustain the third count.

In excluding the evidence, the trial

court specifically stated that considerat u «" ot 1, litf 1, ape would
not have affected its ultimate finding.
5S Section 352 provides, "The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues,
or of misleading the jury." -The discretion granted the trial
court by section 352 is not absolute [citations] and must be
exercised reasonably in accord with the facts before the
court." (Brainard v. Cotner (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 790, 796.)
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The Court of Appeal again reversed, holding that
although the "clergyman malpractice" count failed to state a
cause of action separate from the "negligence" count/ both
could be construed as stating a cause of action for the
"negligent failure to prevent suicide" by "nontherapist
counselors."

In this context, the Court of Appeal held that

nontherapist counselors —

both religious and secular —

have

a duty to refer suicidal persons to psychiatrists or
psychotherapists qualified to prevent suicides.

Moreover, the

court held, imposition of a negligence standard of care on
pastoral counselors does not impinge on the free exercise of
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, because the
state's compelling interest in the preservation of life
justifies the narrowly tailored burden on religious expression
imposed by such tort liability.

Although the Court of Appeal

found "the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding
[defendant] Church negligently breached its duty to train its
counselees in their responsibilities to refer suicidal
counselors or to otherwise insure they were aware of the
responsibilities . . . ," the court also found that there
existed "sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable
person to have concluded some or all of [defendants']
counselors actually exercised reasonable care in attempting to
refer [Nally] to mental health professionals authorized and
equipped to prevent an imminent suicide."
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The Court of Appeal also found that the trial
court's grant of nonsuit for insufficiency of the evidence
flowed from its erroneous exclusion of the tape-recorded
excerpt in which Pastor Thomson discussed his view of suicide
and salvation.

The Court of Appeal determined that evidence

of Thomson's "religious belief was "highly probative" of his
past state of mind and an indication of the content of the
religious counseling he may have given Nally.

The majority

rejected defendants' First Amendment defenses to intentional
tort liability, claiming that under the law-of-the-case
doctrine, Nally I was dispositive on whether the First
Amendment would operate to relieve defendants of liability.
Justice Cole dissented, asserting that the
majority's holding rested on broad policy determinations best
left to the Legislature.

The dissent reasoned that the

"essence of the duty imposed by the majority is to require the
disclosures which existing law has declined to require."
Furthermore, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
imposition of liability on the third cause of action for
wrongful death based on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress on Nally, pointing out that the majority
"ignored the record" and created an unconstitutional
distinction between different ecclesiastic purposes.
Our review of the record reveals the trial court
correctly granted a nonsuit as to plaintiffs' causes of
action.

Neither the evidence adduced at trial nor well-
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established principles of tort law support the Court of
Appeal's reversal of nonsuit in this case. As we explain
below, we need not address the constitutional issues posed by
defendants.
IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Fpngyit
A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial

court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence
presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to
find in his favor.

(Campbell v. General Motors (1982) 32

Cal.3d 112, 117-118.)

"In determining whether plaintiff's

evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence
or consider the credibility of witnesses.

Instead, the

evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true
and conflicting evidence must be disregarded.

The court must

give 'to the plaintiff['s] evidence all the value to which it
is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate
inference which may be drawn from the evidence in
plaintiff['s] favor.1"

(Id., at p. 118.) A mere "scintilla

of evidence" does not create a conflict for the jury's
resolution; "there must be substantial evidence to create the
necessary conflict."

(7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985)

Trial, § 410, p. 413, italics in original.)
In reviewing a grant of nonsuit, we are "guided by
the same rule requiring evaluation of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff."
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(Carson v. Facilities

Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 839.) We will not
sustain the judgment "'unless interpreting the evidence most
favorably to plaintiff's case and most strongly against the
defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and
doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant
is required as a matter of law.'"

(Ibid., quoting Mason v.

Peaslee (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 587, 588.)

Keeping in mind the

foregoing standard of review, we now turn to the merits.

B.

cevse of Action for Negligent Failure to Prevent Suicide
As stated above, the Court of Appeal characterized

the first two counts of plaintiffs' complaint (for clergyman
malpractice and negligence) as together stating a cause of
action for the "negligent failure [by a nontherapist
counselor] to prevent suicide."

Conceding that "research

[did] not uncover any court decision which has ruled one way
or the other specifically on the existence or scope of a
nontherapist counselor's duty toward suicidal counselees," and
that it was venturing "along a largely uncharted path," the
Court of Appeal imposed a new and broad duty of care on such
counselors without any discussion of causation under the
present facts.
As Justice Cole pointed out in his dissent, however,
the obligation imposed by the majority is loosely phrased.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal used widely varying terminology
describing the duty of care arising under the first two causes
of action.

At different points in its opinion, the Court of
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Appeal referred to the duty imposed on nontherapist counselors
as a duty "to refer counselees to those who possess . . .
powers to prevent an imminent suicide"; "to refer . . . to
those individuals or institutions authorized and specially
suited to prevent suicide"; "to take steps to place [a
suicidal person] in the hands of those to whom society has
given the authority and who by education and experience are in
the best position to prevent the suicidal individual from
succeeding in killing himself"; "informing those in a position
to prevent the counselee's suicide about the factors
suggesting the counselee's imminent plans to kill himself";
"to insure their counselees also are under the care of
psychotherapists, psychiatric facilities, or others authorized
and equipped to forestall imminent suicide"; and finally, "to
take appropriate measures to prevent [a] suicide."

As we

explain below, we reject the Court of Appeal's imposition of
a broad "duty to refer" on defendants and nontherapist
counselors in general.
1.

Legal Requirements for Imposing a Duty of Care
a)

Creation pf g Duty

"A tort, whether intentional or negligent, involves
a violation of a legal duty, imposed by statute, contract or
otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person injured.
Without such a duty, any injury is 'damnum absque injuria*
injury without wrong.

[Citations.]"

—

(Witkin, Summary of Cal.

Law (10th ed. 1988) Torts, § 6, p. 61, italics in original.)
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Thus, in order to prove facts sufficient to support a finding
of negligence, a plaintiff must show that defendant had a duty
to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the
breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting
injury.

(United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes Inc.

(1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 594.)
Under traditional tort law principles, one is
ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under
no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a
special relationship of custody or control.

(Davidson v. City

of Westminister (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203; Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435.) Moreover, in
determining the existence of a duty of care in a given case,
we must consider several factors, including the
"foreseeability of harm to [the injured party], the degree of
certainty that [he] suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between [defendants'] conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to [defendants], the policy
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant[s] and consequences to the community of imposing
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved."
Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)

(Rowland v.

Thus, because liability

for negligence turns on whether a duty of care is owed, our
first task is to determine whether a duty exists in the
present case.
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b) Specigi Relationship
Although we have not previously addressed the issue
presently before us, we have imposed a duty to prevent a
foreseeable suicide only when a special relationship existed
between the suicidal individual and the defendant or its
agents.

For example, two cases imposed such a duty in

wrongful death actions after plaintiffs proved that the
deceased committed suicide in a hospital or other in-patient
facility that had accepted the responsibility to care for and
attend to the needs of the suicidal patient.

(See Meier v.

Ross General Hospital (1968) 69 Cal.2d 420; Vistica v.
Presbyterian Hospital (1967) 67 Cal.2d 465.)

In Meier, a

cause of action for negligence was held to exist against both
the treating psychiatrist and the hospital, and in Vistica,
liability was imposed on the hospital alone, the only named
defendant in the case.
The Court of Appeal here would extend the previously
carefully limited precedent, relying initially for the
creation of a duty of care (on defendants and other
nontherapist counselors) in the foregoing Meier and Vistica
cases.

Indeed, the Court of Appeal specifically stated that

"Logic and policy both dictate the duty announced in those
cases applies to non-therapist counselors as well." We
disagree.

As defendants and amici curiae point out# Meier and

Vistica are readily distinguishable from the facts of the
present case and, as we explain, severely circumscribe the
duty they create.
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Both Meier and Vistica address the issue of a
special relationship, giving rise to a duty to take
precautions to prevent suicide, in the limited context of
hospital-patient relationships where the suicidal person died
while under the care and custody of hospital physicians who
were aware of the patient's unstable mental condition.

In

both cases, the patient committed suicide while confined in a
hospital psychiatric ward.

Liability was imposed because

defendants failed to take precautions to prevent the patient's
suicide even though the medical staff in charge of the
patient's care knew that the patient was likely to attempt to
take his own life.
Neither case suggested extending the duty of care to
personal or religious counseling relationships in which one
person provided nonprofessional guidance to another seeking
advice and the counselor had no control over the environment
of the individual being counseled.

In sharp contrast, Nally

was not involved in a supervised medical relationship with
defendants, and he committed suicide well over two weeks after
he was released from the hospital against the advice of his
attending psychiatrist and physician.
Plaintiffs and the Court of Appeal also rely on
Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 620-623, as
supporting the existence of a special relationship sufficient
to impose a duty of care on nontherapist counselors to refer a
counselee to a licensed mental health professional once the
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potential suicide becomes foreseeable.

As we explain, the

Court of Appeal would unduly extend the Bellah holding.
In Bellah, two years after their daughter's suicide,
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against a psychiatrist who had been treating the daughter on an out-patient
basis.

Plaintiffs alleged the existence of a psychiatrist-

patient relationship between defendant and their daughter,
knowledge on the part of the defendant that their daughter
was likely to attempt suicide, and a failure by defendant to
take appropriate preventative measures "consonant with good
medical practice in the community."
Cal.App.3d at p. 620.)

(Bellah, supra, 81

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial

court's order sustaining defendant's demurrer after concluding
that the action was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.
In dictum, the Bellah court recognized that although
plaintiffs' action was time barred, they had stated a
traditional medical malpractice cause of action for the breach
of a psychiatrist's duty of care to his patient.

Bellah

stated that this duty may be imposed on the treating
psychiatrist even though his patient committed suicide outside
the confines of a hospital.

(Id., at p. 620.)

It is

important to recognize, however, that rather than creating a
broad duty to refer, the Bellah court simply recognized that
plaintiffs had stated a -cause of action for the breach by a
medical practitioner of the duty of care owed to his patient
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Generally, there is a real question about the closeness
of t h e causal connection between a nontherapist counselor's
failure to refer to professional help and t h e suicide of a
particular suicidal person. B y their very definition/
nontherapist counselors a r e not professional m e d i c a l experts
on s u i c i d e . Their activities are undertaken pursuant to
d o c t r i n e s explicitly left unregulated b y t h e s t a t e . (See post
at p p .
[typed opn. at p p . 29-30].)
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stated above# following Nallyfs overdose attempt Dr. Evelyn
warned plaintiffs that Nally remained suicidal and that they
should encourage him to see a psychiatrist on his release from
the hospital.

Plaintiffs also rejected both Dr. Hall9s and

Dr. Parker's suggestion that Nally be institutionalized
because, according to plaintiffs, their son was "not crazy."
Nevertheless, we are urged that mere knowledge on
the part of the defendants that Nally may have been suicidal
at various stages in his life should give rise to a duty to
refer.

Imposition of a duty to refer Nally necessarily

would imply a general duty on all nontherapists to refer all
potentially suicidal persons to licensed medical practitioners.
One can argue that it is foreseeable that if a
nontherapist counselor fails to refer a potentially suicidal
individual to professional, licensed therapeutic care, the
individual may commit suicide. While under some circumstances
counselors may conclude that referring a client to a
psychiatrist is prudent and necessary, our past decisions
teach that it is inappropriate to impose a duty to refer —
which may stifle all gratuitous or religious counseling
based on foreseeability alone.

—

Mere foreseeability of the

harm or knowledge of the danger, is insufficient to create a
legally cognizable special relationship giving rise to a legal
duty to prevent harm.

(See Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d 197,

209.)
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d)

Public Policy Considerations

Imposing a duty on defendants or other nontherapist
counselors to# in the Court of Appeal's words, "insure their
counselees [are also] under the care of psychotherapists,
psychiatric facilities, or others authorized and equipped to
forestall imminent suicide," could have a deleterious effect
on counseling in general.
at p. 621.)

(See Bellah, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d

Although both plaintiffs and the present Court of

Appeal, in dictum, exempt services such as "teen hotlines"
which offer only "band aid counseling," from a newly
formulated standard of care that would impose a "duty to
refer," the indeterminate nature of liability the Court of
Appeal imposes on nontherapist counselors could deter those
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that
their private disclosures could subject them to involuntary
commitment to psychiatric facilities.
As defendants, amici curiae, and the Court of Appeal
dissenter observe, neither the Legislature nor the courts have
ever imposed a legal obligation on persons to take affirmative
steps to prevent the suicide of one who is not under the care
of a physician in a hospital.

(See Katona v. County of

Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 53, 59; see also, Searcy
v. Hemet Unified School District (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792,
804 [school district owes duty to safeguard student on school
premises during school hours, but owes no such duty once the
student has departed for home].)
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Indeed, for all practical

purposes, a doctor to whom a nontherapist counselor refers a
suicidal person may refuse to take the patient.

Furthermore,

under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 5200, 5201), "[a]ny individual may" but is not required
to institute involuntary commitment proceedings.
We also note that the Legislature has exempted the
clergy from the licensing requirements applicable to marriage,
family, child and domes±jj:___counselors (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 4980 et seq.) and from the operation of statutes regulating
psychologists (id, § 2908 et seq.).

In so doing, the Legisla-

ture has recognized_that—SQCe^s, to the clergy for counseling
should be free from state imposed counseling standards, and
that "the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the
competence of counseling when performed by those affiliated
with religious organizations."

(Ericsson, Clergyman

Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory (1981) 16 Val.U.L.
Rev. 163, 176.)
Furthermore, extending li^ability to voluntary,
noncommercial and noncustodial relationships is contrary to
the trend in the Legislature to encourage private assistance
efforts.

This public policy goal is expressed in the acts of

the Legislature abrogating the "Good Samaritan" rule.
Statutes barring the imposition of ordinary negligence
liability on one who aids another now embrace numerous
scenarios.

(See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 50086 [exempting from

liability first aid volunteers summoned by authorities to
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assist in search or rescue operations]; Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 1799.100, 1799.102 [exempting from liability nonprofessional persons giving cardiopulmonary resuscitation]*)
On occasion, when the courts have recognized a new
duty of care sufficient to impose liability for the breach
thereof, they have noted that the "wrongs and injuries
involved were both comprehensible and assessable within the
existing judicial framework."

(Peter W. v. San Francisco

Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 824 [refusing to
impose liability on school district for graduated plaintiffs
inability to read and write]; see also, Dillon v. Legg (1968)
68 Cal.2d 728, 742-747.)
Even assuming that workable standards of care could
be established in the present case, an additional difficulty
arises in attempting to identify with precision those to whom
the duty should apply.

Because of the differing theological

views espoused by the myriad of religions in our state^and
practiced by church members, it would certainly be
impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose
a duty of care on pastoral counselors.

Such a duty would

necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of
the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the
religious entity.

(See Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches

and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment
Considerations (1986) 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 1, 82-84; Comment,
Religious Torts:

Applying the Consent Doctrine as
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Definitional Balancing (1986) 19 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 949,
963-964, fn. 69; also, Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S.
602.) We have previously refused to impose a duty when to do
sojwould involve complex policy decisions, and we are
unpersuadedby^plaintiffs that we should depart frorn^this
policy in the present case.

(See Thomson v. County of Alameda

(1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 754-755; Bill v. Superior Court (1982)
137 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1012-1013.)

e) Availability of Insurance
As several commentators observe, although lawsuits
stemming from spiritual counseling are few, a new type of
"clergyman malpractice" insurance has been offered to
religious organizations to protect against potential liability
for spiritual counseling that causes injury.

(See, e.g.,

Note, Intentipngl Infliction pf Emptipnal Distress by
Spiritual Counselors:

Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free

Exercise?" (1986) 84 Mich.L.Rev. 1296, 1300, fn. 12.)
Apparently, such insurance provides coverage to religious
congregations and their pastors for damages caused by the
counseling activities of the pastors while acting within the
scope of their duties.

(Ibid.)

The value of such insurance,

however, is unknown and difficult to determine because few
cases have been filed against the clergy.
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f)

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
plaintiffs have not met the threshold requirements for
imposing on defendants a duty to prevent suicide.
supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)

(Rowland,

Plaintiffs failed to persuade us

that the duty to prevent suicide (heretofore imposed only on
psychiatrists and hospitals while caring for a suicidal
patient) or the general professional duty of care (heretofore
imposed only on psychiatrists when treating a mentally
disturbed patient) should be extended to a nontherapist
counselor who offers counseling to a potentially suicidal
person on secular or spiritual matters.
In the present case, the Court of Appeal erroneously
created a broad duty to refer, and to hold defendants
potentially accountable for Nally's death based on their
counseling activities would place blame unreasonably and
contravene existing public policy.^

Accordingly, we

conclude the trial court correctly granted defendants* nonsuit
motion as to the "clergyman malpractice" or negligence causes
of action.

&f
Our opinion does not foreclose imposing liability on
nontherapist counselors, who hold themselves out as
professionals, for injuries related to their counseling
activities.
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C.

Cause of Action for Wrongful Death Based on Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress

a) Elements pf the Tort
The elements of a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are (i) outrageous conduct
by defendant, (ii) an intention by defendant to cause, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress, (iii) severe emotional distress, and (iv) an actual
and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and
the emotional distress.

(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection

Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 155, fn. 7.)

The w[c]onduct must

be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community."

(Davidson, supra, 32

Cal.3d at p. 209, quoting from Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co.
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593.) As stated in part III hereof, the
Court of Appeal limited its discussion of the third cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, to
the question of whether the trial court erred in (i) excluding
the tape pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, and (ii)
granting the nonsuit motion as to the intentional infliction
of emotional distress count.
We have found only one California case in which an
appellate court affirmed a trial court decision overruling a
demurrer and allowing a cause of action for wrongful death
based on defendant's outrageous conduct in causing a suicide.
In Tate v. Canonica (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 898, 909, the court
allowed a widow to state a cause of action for wrongful death
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based on intentional infliction of emotional distress after
she alleged that defendant intentionally made threats and
accusations against her husband and such conduct was a
substantial factor in bringing about the husband*s suicide.
The Tate court rejected as inapplicable to intentional torts,
the defenses of supervening cause and contributory negligence.
(Id., at p. 908.)

Thus, under Tate, a plaintiff may resist a

demurrer to a wrongful death action for intentional conduct
leading to suicide if he can allege facts sufficient to show
that defendant's conduct was outrageous and a substantial
factor in the decedent's suicide.

(Tate, supra, 180

Cal.App.2d 898, 909.) With the foregoing in mind, we now turn
to the present case in order to determine whether the trial
court properly excluded the tape of Pastor Thomson's 1980
lecture under Evidence Code section 352, or whether the
evidence was relevant to proving plaintiffs' third cause of
action consistently with the Tate and Davidson, supra, 32
Cal.3d 197, standards.
b)

Procedural Background

The Court of Appeal did not discuss defendants'
First Amendment defenses to the admissibility of the tape
recording, because it believed it was bound, under the law of
the case doctrine (discussed below), by the holding in Nallv I
that the First Amendment did not immunize defendants from
liability.

The court, however, did not believe it was

prevented from examining the "sufficiency of the evidence
introduced at trial to support the third count."
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The court found, as did the Court of Appeal in
Nallv I, that the tape recording was essential to establishing
plaintiffs* cause of action for wrongful death based on
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that its
exclusion was therefore erroneous.

The court stated that in

"[c]onstruing the evidence [including the tape recording] most
favorably to [plaintiffs] we conclude a reasonable juror could
have found the counselors acted recklessly in a way which
encouraged this suicide."
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, do not address the
merits of the trial court's exclusion of the tape but instead
argue that the trial and appellate courts are bound by the
law-of-the-case doctrine insofar as it precludes
reconsideration of defendants' asserted constitutional
defenses and the objections concerning the viability of
plaintiffs* third cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.

Plaintiffs assert that we are bound by

the appellate court ruling in Nally I that the facts of this
case satisfy the requirements of the substantive tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
c)

£aw-Qf-the-C9ge Doctrine

Under this doctrine, "the decision of an appellate
court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the
case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it
determinative of the rights of the same parties in any
subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.*
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(9 Witkin,

Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 737, pp. 705-707.)

The

rule is not invoked where the sufficiency of the evidence
necessary to sustain the judgment depends on the probative
value or effect of the evidence itself, and the evidence in
the second trial is changed.
p. 718.)

(9 Witkin, supra, § 750, at

Similarly, the doctrine does not apply to points of

law that might have been, but were not determined on the prior
appeal.

(9 Witkin, supra, § 752 at pp. 719-720; Tally v.

Ganahl (1907) 151 C. 418, 421.)
Recently, an additional reason for declining to
apply the doctrine was announced in Searle v. Allstate Life
Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, in which we held:

"The primary

purpose served by the law-of-the-case rule is one of judicial
economy.

Finality is attributed to an initial appellate

ruling so as to avoid the further reversal and proceedings on
remand that would result if the initial ruling were not adhered
to in a later appellate proceeding . . . .

[T]hat reason for

the rule is inoperative when the court hearing the subsequent
appeal determines that there should be a reversal on a ground
that was not considered on the prior appeal.

The fact that

reversal is necessary in any event frees us from the compulsion
that the rule of law of the case might otherwise impose on us
to follow a ruling in the prior appeal that we do not perceive
to be manifestly erroneous."

(38 Cal.3d at p. 435.)

We perceive no obstacle under the law-of-the-case
doctrine to reviewing the evidentiary question regarding the
tape recording's rdmissibility.
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Contrary to plaintiffs'

assertion that we are bound by a theoretical imposition of
liability on defendants based on the findings in Nallv I, the
Court of Appeal there found only that plaintiffs had raised a
triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion, and therefore did not determine liability as
plaintiffs seem to imply.
As we explain below, however, we disagree with the
Court of Appeal*s conclusion that the trial court improperly
excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to reach the broader
constitutional issues raised by the parties, or the validity
of the Court of Appeal's holding that the constitutional
defense was barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine,
d)

Analysis pf the Evidently Ruling

In 1981, 18 months after Nally's suicide, Pastor
Thomson taught a series of classes of biblical counseling.
The class sessions included question and answer periods that
were tape recorded.

During one session, a student questioned

Thompson on whether a person who committed suicide could be
"saved."

Thompson replied, in a manner consistent with

Reformation Protestant theology views regarding sin, grace and
faith, that a person neither acquires salvation by his own
works nor forfeits salvation by the commission of subsequent
sins.

Plaintiffs sought to introduce the tape recording at

trial on the basis that it provided inferential proof of
Thomson's advice to Nally during the three counseling sessions
in 1979.
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The court held extensive hearings outside the
presence of the jury on the admissibility of the recording to
determine whether its content was relevant.

During the in

camera sessions, the court pointed out that even if the
recording were admitted, there was no evidence Thomson spoke
similar words to Nally during their counseling sessions or
that such words could have contributed in any way to, or
proximately caused, Nally's death.

The court also observed

that the best way to establish what Thomson told Nally was
through direct examination.

Eventually, the court ruled

it would not admit the recording, "on the basis that its
relevancy is such that it would necessitate the undue
consumption of time, would create substantial danger of
undue influence to the jury and could confuse the issues
and be misleading to the jury."

(See Evid. Code, § 352.)

In determining whether the trial court properly
exercised discretion in excluding the tape, we consider
the relationship between the evidence and the relevant
inferences to be drawn from it.
77 Cal.App.3d 284, 291.)

(See Kessler v. Gray (1978)

The Court of Appeal stated that the

tape recording was relevant to prove Pastor Thomson's "own
personal state of mind on the question of suicide and suicide
counseling and how other counselors were trained on these
issues."

The court asserted that "the statements on the

tape [were] relevant to prove the probable content of the
counseling the defendants offered [to] the plaintiffs*
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suicidal son.

The tape recordings tend to establish the

customary approach the Church*s counselors used when
counseling suicidal individuals."

These conclusions appear

to misstate the relevant evidence.
First, as the trial court found, the tape does not
tend to prove that defendants in any way encouraged Nally to
commit suicide or acted recklessly in disregard of Nally's
emotional state prior to his suicide.

(See People v. Jones

(1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222.) Although there is some indication
in the record that Nally may have attended some of defendants*
bible classes between 1974 and 1979, there is no evidence that
Thomson was ever asked about salvation and suicide during a
lecture prior to 1980 or that he would have given a similar
response at that time if he had been so asked.

Moreover, as

Thomson himself testified, his responses to questions in the
classroom setting would by their very nature differ from the
way he handled an individual counseling session because he
would have considered the emotional state of the individual
and his particular counseling needs during the counseling
session.
In addition, the evidence was simply too temporally
remote to establish any causal connection with Nally*s
suicide.

As Justice Cole's dissent in the Court of Appeal

observes, "what was said in an extemporaneous answer# which
did not precisely reflect the thoughts of Pastor Thomson,
given almost two years after the incident at issue is at best
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marginally relevant to prove what was said at the time in
question.

The trial judge made a carefully considered

decision after considerable deliberation. Clearly, there
was a basis for the trial court's ruling that admission of
the tape created substantial danger of misleading the jury
and prejudicing the defendants."

Based on the foregoing,

we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the
response given by Pastor Thomson to an inquiry by a seminary
student almost two years after Nally's suicide could assist
in establishing what Pastor Thomson told Nally during the
individual counseling sessions.
Finally, "California trial judges have considerable discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.-

(Michail v. Fluor Mining &

Metals, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 284, 286.)

Because the

record shows that the trial court carefully and properly
weighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its
probative value, the Court of Appeal erred in finding that
a substantial abuse of discretion occurred in excluding the
evidence.
V.

CONCLUSION

We conclude the trial court correctly granted a
nonsuit on all causes of action.

The suicide of a young

man in the prime of his life is a profound tragedy.
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After

considering plaintiffs' arguments and evidence, however, we
hold that defendants had no duty to Nally on which to base
liability for his unfortunate death.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and
the Court of Appeal is directed to enter judgment affirming
the judgment of nonsuit and dismissing the action.

LUCAS, C.J.

WE CONCUR:
MOSK, J.
PANELLI, J.
ARGUELLES, J.
EAGLESON, J.
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CONCURRING OPINION BY KAUFMAN, J.

I concur in the judgment that nonsuit was properly
granted, but disagree with the majority's holding that
defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs.
The majority appears to reject the proposition that
defendants in this matter, or "nontherapist counselors in
general," have a duty to advise potentially suicidal
counselees to seek competent medical care.
p.

(Maj. opn. at

[typed opn. at p. 19].) Yet the majority does not

purport to "foreclose imposing liability on nontherapist
counselors, who hold themselves out as professionals, for
injuries related to their counseling activities." (Maj.
opn. at p.

, fn. 8 [typed opn. at p. 33, fn. 8].)

1

In view of the majority's suggestion that a
nontherapist counselor who holds himself out as competent to
treat a suicidal person owes a duty of care to that person,
I am baffled as to the basis or the necessity of the
majority's broad conclusion that "nontherapist counselors in
general" do not owe such a duty.
record, viewed —

The evidence in the

as the law requires —

in plaintiffs'

favor, demonstrates that defendants (1) expressly held
themselves out as fully competent to deal with the most
severe psychological disorders, including major depression
with suicidal symptoms, (2) developed a close counseling
relationship with Kenneth Nally for that very purpose, and
(3) realized that Nally's suicide was at least a
possibility.

Thus, the evidence was more than sufficient,

in my view, to trigger a minimal duty of care to Nally.
What was fatally absent from plaintiffs' case was not
evidence of duty, but proof that defendants breached that
duty, and that such breach constituted a proximate cause of
Nally's suicide.

Therefore, while I concur in the decision

to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and to
reinstate the judgment of nonsuit and dismissal of the
action, I strongly disagree with the conclusion that
defendants owed no duty of care in this matter.
FACTS
While the majority faithfully chronicles the tragic
sequence of events which led to Nally*s suicide, it quite
inexplicably overlooks the substantial evidence
2

adduced by plaintiffs relating to the nature and extent of
the pastoral counseling offered by defendants.

The picture

which emerges from the record is decidedly not that of a
small band of simple pastors who offered occasional
counseling on minor matters to the faithful few. The Grace
Community Church (Church), at the time of the events in
question, employed about 50 pastoral counselors to serve a
congregation of over 10,000 persons.

Pastoral counseling,

as described in the Church's 1979 annual report, constituted
"a very important part of the ministry at Grace Church."
Church counselors offered their services not only to
congregants, but to large numbers of nonmembers as well.

In

1979, the annual report noted, about 50 percent of those
seeking counseling came from outside the Church.
Furthermore, while much of the counseling to members was
apparently of an ad hoc or "drop-in" nature, more formal
counseling was offered as well, with regularly scheduled
counseling "sessions" much like those between a therapist
and a patient; indeed, the Church employed a secretary whose
responsibilities included the making and scheduling of such
counseling appointments.

Moreover, in addition to

individual counseling, a number of Church pastors taught

3

classes, published books and sold tape recordings on the
subject of biblical counseling.I'
In addition to the foregoing, plaintiffs adduced
substantial evidence relating to the stated ability of the
Church's pastoral counselors to deal with serious emotional
and psychological disorders.

Several of the counselors

testified that they considered themselves fully competent to
treat a whole range of mental illnesses, including
depression and schizophrenia —

indeed, as Pastor Thomson

testified, "any type of emotional problem."

Several of the

A'
Contrast this picture of the Church's extensive
involvement in pastoral counseling (based on evidence in the
record), with that portrayed in the majority opinion. The
majority writes: "According to the trial testimony of
defendant Senior Pastor MacArthur, 'Grace Community Church
does not have a professional or clinical ministry. We don't
run a counseling center as such. We aren't paid for that,
and we don't solicit that . . . .'" (Maj. opn. at p.
[typed opn. at p. 4].) While not a major point in itself,
such selective citation of the record undoubtedly colors
one's overall assessment of the case, and to that extent is
objectionable. As the majority itself notes, on review of a
nonsuit "the evidence most favorable to plaintiffTsl must be
accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be
disregarded. The court must give to the plaintiffTs'1
evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled,
. . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be
drawn from the evidence in plaintiff fs'1 favor." (Campbell
v. General Motors (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117-118, italics
added.) The majority has reversed this fundamental
principle of appellate review, stating the evidence,
resolving all factual conflicts, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of defendants. Moreover, in addition to
the above example, violations of this principle occur
throughout the majority opinion. (See fns. 2, 3, 4, and 5,
post, at pp.
[typed opn. at pp. 6, 7-8, 9-10, 10-11].)
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counselors who testified, including Pastors Rea, Barshaw and
Thomson, claimed to possess not only competence, but broad
experience in the counseling of persons with recurrent
suicidal or even homicidal tendencies.
This asserted capacity to handle severe
psychological disorders was also reflected in a Church
publication entitled "Guide For Biblical Counselors"
(Guide).

Pastor Thomson was the author of the Guide, which

served as a basic text for aspiring biblical counselors and
was required reading in Thomson's class on biblical
counseling.

According to Pastor Thomson, absent a gross

physiological cause such as a brain tumor, "every emotional
problem" was within the competence of the pastoral counselor
to handle.

Among the symptoms or disorders the Guide listed

as falling within the pastoral counselor's domain were "drug
abuse, alcoholism, phobias, deep depression, suicide, mania,
nervous breakdown, manic-depressive [disorder] and
schizophrenia."

The Guide devoted separate sections to a

number of these disorders, including suicide, with
hypothetical questions and answers interspersed throughout
the text.

One such exchange read as follows:

"[Question]:

You mean 1 could counsel with an extreme problem like a
suicidal tendency or nervous breakdown or something like
that?

M[]

[Answer]:

With the proper understanding of

God*s Word to diagnose and treat the problems, this could
5

not only be done occasionally but could become the rule.H^/
Nally was well aware of defendants' self-proclaimed
proficiency at treating severe depression and suicidal
symptoms.

Nally was a student in Pastor Thomson's course on

biblical counseling, which used the Guide as a text, and
affirmatively sought out formal or informal pastoral
counseling from defendants during each of his several
suicidal crises.
Moreover, the record leaves no doubt that
defendants were aware of, and affirmatively undertook to
deal with, Nally's recurrent depression and suicidal
thoughts.

In January 1978, Nally initiated a counseling

relationship with Pastor Rea.

Rea testified that he had

formal counseling sessions with Nally during the first four
months of 1978, as well as many informal sessions both
before and after that time.

During these sessions,

according to Pastor Rea, Nally often appeared distraught and

*•'
How the majority could omit from its opinion this
extensive evidence of defendants' "holding out" is quite
beyond my understanding. (See fn. 1, ante, at p.
[typed
opn. at p. 4] .)

6

cried, indicating that he "couldn't cope."

Rea specifically

recalled Nally's statement to him in his office, "I just
can't live this life."

Rea, who considered himself both

qualified and experienced in the handling of depressed and
sucidal individuals, evaluated Nally as being
"depressed."3/

3/
The majority asserts that I have mischaracterized
Rea's testimony, that in fact "Rea did not become aware
Nally could not cope in the physical sense until after his
suicide attempt." (Maj. opn. at p.
[typed opn. at p. 5,
fn. 2, original italics.) On the contrary, the majority
either ignores the full record of Rea's testimony or,
contrary to fundamental principles of appellate review,
draws only those inferences favorable to defendants. It
must be recalled that Rea was testifying as a hostile
witness under Evidence Code section 776; his responses on
direct examination were both dissembling and contradictory.
Time and again, Rea was impeached with his own counseling
notes or prior deposition testimony. So it was with his
testimony regarding Nally's expressed inability to "cope."
Initially, Rea admitted that Nally had stated that from time
to time he could not "cope." Rea immediately denied,
however, that the "cope concept" had "come out" until after
Nally's first suicide attempt. Counsel then confronted Rea
with his own counseling notes, and Rea was forced to admit
that just the opposite was true.
"Q: Isn't it your recollection that from January
forward, Ken frequently used that term, 'I don't know how to
cope.'?
"A: Frequently? I can't say that, but I wrote
down to express what Ken expressed to me.
"Q: And from time to time he used that phrase?
"A: I would have to say so from that record.
"Q: From time to time he used it before you
terminated the formal counseling relationship?
"A: That's true.
"Q: Thank you."
Later, Rea attempted to characterize Nally's
comments as referring exclusively to the "spirituals not
the "physical" life. When confronted with his prior
deposition testimony, however, Rea was compelled to concede
that the idea of suicide was fairly inferable from Nally's
(Footnote continued on next page.)
7

In 1974/ when Nally first joined the Church, he
developed a close friendship with Pastor Cory# who was
(Footnote continued from previous page,)
statements and conduct during the counseling sessions:
"Q: Was there an inference of suicide?
M
A: Not to my knowledge.
"Q: Look to page 70 of your depo. Read from line
7 on down.
M
MR. COOKSEY: How far, counsel?
"MR. BARKER: Down through line 22.
M
Q: BY MR. BARKER: Does that refresh your
recollection?
"A: Yes.
M
Q: Was there an inference of suicide in some of
the things Ken said?
"A: Inference in the extent (sic) of coping and
how far you stretch the word/ not being able to live this
life# but the life is not physical life; it's the spiritual
life.
M
Q: There was an inference of suicide in some of
the things Ken said during the normal counseling sessions?
"A: It could be construed that way.
"Q: And the term inference was your term: is that
correct?
M
A: Xes.M (Italics added.)
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable
to plaintiffs, it is reasonable to conclude that Nally's
statements and actions during his counseling sessions with
Rea reasonably indicated the possibility of suicide. The
point, it should be stressed/ is not that defendants knew or
should have known that Nally would commit suicide; the
point/ rather, is that the evidence was sufficient to raise
the reasonable possibility, and the reasonable possibility
was sufficient to trigger a minimal duty to advise Nally to
seek competent medical care.

8

responsible for overseeing the ministry to the collegians
attending the Church.

In December 1978, after Nally's

breakup with his girlfriend, Cory became concerned about
Nally*s apparent depression and referred him to Pastors Rea
or Thomson for counseling.

In late February or early March

of 1979, Nally did approach Pastor Thomson and told him that
he was depressed about his relationship with his girlfriend
and his family.

Nally told Thomson that he had once before

considered suicide.

Thomson, who considered himself both

qualified and experienced in the counseling of severe
depression, felt that there was an "intimation" of suicide
in Nally's statements and concluded that suicide was a
"vague possibility."4/ Although Thomson testified that he

3/
The majority suggests that I have mischaracterized
the record of Thomson's testimony. (Maj. opn. at p.
,
fn.
[typed opn. at p. 6, fn. 3].) On the contrary, the
majority has simply construed the evidence most favorably to
defendants, rather than, as the law requires, indulging all
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs.
In fact, Thomson testified as follows:
"Q: You reached the conclusion, didn't you, at the
end of your first meeting with Ken in March, that Ken might
try suicide?
H
A: There was that vague possibility, yes. I
didn't conclude within myself that it was a serious enough
likelihood where other help would be needed at this point,
so I counseled him and prayed for him.
"Q: Did you think that Ken, in fact, might try
suicide?
"A: It was a possibility. It was a vague
possibility, yes.
Thomson further testified:
"Q: And you then concluded, after your questioning
session, that although there was some possibility of
suicide, it wasn't likely?
(Footnote continued on next page.)
9

took such intimations •'seriously," he concluded that he
could continue to help Nally with his problems through
counseling and prayer.
Several weeks later, after Nally had in fact
attempted suicide, Nally approached Thomson on two more
separate occasions.

During their second informal meeting,

which lasted about an hour, Nally again, according to
Thomson, -intimated" suicide and again Thomson concluded
that suicide was a "possibility" which he continued to take
"seriously. M £/

During the third meeting between Nally and

Thomson, the latter remained convinced that suicide was a
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
"A: That's true."
Elsewhere he testified:
"Q: And you concluded that he probably wasn't
going to commit suicide, but it was a possibility?
"A: It was a vague possibility, yes.
"Q: You took that possibility seriously?
"A: Yes.
"Q: And in taking it seriously, you talked with
him about biblical concepts and about what his inter [sic]
strifes were that led to his depression and led to his
suicidal feelings?
"A: Yes.
"Q: But you did not talk to anyone else after that
meeting with Ken about the fact that Ken might be a threat
to himself before the Verdugo attempt?
"A: Not that I recall."
5S
Concerning this second meeting, Thomson testified
as follows:
"Q: And in that second visit, the suicide was
discussed again, wasn't it?
"A: Yes. There was that possibility
....
"Q: In trying to help him as he was down, did you
indirectly make an effort to find out if he was going to try
again?
(Footnote continued on next page.)
10

"possibility."&S

Although Thomson was persuaded that Nally

was depressed and "intimat[ing]M suicide, he continued to
believe that he could help him through biblical counseling.
After Nally was released from the hospital
following his suicide attempt in March 1979, he went to stay
with another Church counselor, Pastor MacArthur.

During

long discussions over the next week, Nally discussed his
depression and thoughts of suicide, and MacArthur became
convinced that suicide was a real possibility.

Indeed,

MacArthur became so concerned from these sessions that he
advised Nally to see a psychiatrist.

One week after Nally

left the MacArthur residence, his fears were realized.

On

April 1, 1979, Nally committed suicide.
DISCUSSION
In light of the foregoing factual background, I
believe the conclusion is inescapable that defendants owed a
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
"A: There was that intimation there, and that's as
far as I wanted to carry it."
&S
Thomson testified as follows concerning the third
meeting:
"Q: Were you — at that time, you still took
seriously Ken's suicidality, didn't you?
•'A: Yes.
"Q: And at that time, as with the first two
visits, you still felt there was a chance Ken was going to
commit suicide?
"A: There was a possibility."

11

duty of care to Nally.

That duty, in my view, was simply to

recognize the limits of their own competence to treat an
individual, such as Nally, who exhibited suicidal
tendencies, and once having recognized such symptoms, to
advise that individual to seek competent professional
medical care.

The record further demonstrates, however, and

the majority correctly concludes, that defendants neither
breached their duty to Nally nor contributed in any legally
significant respect to his suicide.IS
It is black-letter law that one may have an
affirmative duty to protect another from harm where a
"special relationship" exists.

(Williams v. State of

California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23; Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 48; Clarke v. Hoek (1985) 174
Cal.App.3d 208, 215-216; Rest.2d Torts, § 314; Prosser St
Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 56, p. 374.)

The critical

-*-'
Unfortunately, the majority's analysis fails to
properly distinguish between duty and proximate cause.
Based upon a misunderstanding of our seminal decision in
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, the majority
implies that lack of causation precludes the imposition of a
duty. This is a misreading of Rowland. That decision
merely held that the "closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered" was one of
a number of factors which might justify a departure from the
general principle that "all persons are required to use
ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a
result of their conduct." (Id. at pp. 112-113.)

12

question, therefore, is whether there existed some special
relationship between Nally and defendants which would give
rise to an affirmative duty to act.
In the special case of determining the existence of
an affirmative duty to protect another, courts have
traditionally looked to relationships where "the plaintiff
is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds
considerable power over the plaintiffs welfare."

(Prosser

& Keeton, supra, at p. 374.)
The special relationship that arises between a
patient and his doctor or psychotherapist creates an
affirmative duty to see that the patient does no harm either
to himself (Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614,
619)^/ or to others (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of

&S
The majority suggests that I have mischaracterized
the court's holding in Bellah v. Greenson, supra, 81
Cal.App.3d 614. Not so. The Bellah court stated the issues
before it as follows: "[I]n the present case, we must
determine whether plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient
to give rise to a duty on the part of defendant to take
steps to prevent [decedent! from committing suicide or to
advise [decedent's parents] about the existence of
conditions which caused [decedent] to take her own life, so
that they could take such steps." (Id. at p. 619, italics
added.) The Bellah court answered the first question as
follows: "Here, the complaint alleged the existence of a
psychiatrist-patient relationship between defendant and
[decedent], knowledge on the part of the defendant that
[decedent] was likely to attempt suicide, and a failure by
defendant to take appropriate preventive measures. We are
satisfied that these allegations are sufficient to state a
cause of action for the breach of a psychiatrist's duty of
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 436-437).

The relation of

the nontherapist or pastoral counselor to his counselee
contains elements of trust and dependence which closely
resemble those that exist in the therapist-patient context.
Defendants here patently held themselves out as competent to
counsel the mentally ill, and Nally responded to these
inducements, placing his psychological and ultimately his
physical well-being in defendants' care. Whether defendants
adequately fulfilled their responsibilities to Nally is a
separate question to which I will turn in a moment.

That

defendants had some responsibilities to fulfill, however, is
not, in my view, open to question.
Nor is the nature of defendants' duty to Nally
especially difficult to perceive.

As in every negligence

case, the precise nature of the defendant's duty will
necessarily vary with the facts.

(Tarasoff v. Regents of

University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 439.)

In

each instance, the adequacy of the nontherapist counselor's
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
care towards his patient." (Id. at p. 620, italics added.)
My summary of the Bellah court's holding is accurate. A
psychiatrist's duty is to take reasonable steps to prevent a
patient's suicide. This does not imply, as the majority
asserts, that a psychiatrist can guarantee his patients'
safety. On the contrary, as Justice Mosk has observed,
"psychiatric predictions of violence are inherently
unreliable." (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 451 (cone, and dis. opn.
of Mosk, J.).)
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conduct must be judged according to what is reasonable under
the circumstances.

(Ibid.)

Where, as here, defendants have

invited and engaged in an extensive and ongoing pastoral
counseling relationship with an individual whom they
perceive to be suicidal, both reason and sound public policy
dictate that defendants be required to advise that
individual to seek professional medical care.
The point, which the majority persistently
misperceives, is not that Pastors Rea or Thomson or anyone
else should have known that Nally would, in fact, commit
suicide.

The point rather, is that the evidence, read in

the light most favorable to plaintiffs, presents a triable
issue as to whether defendants knew or should have known
that suicide was a sufficient possibility to require that
defendants advise Nally to seek competent medical care.
Notwithstanding the majority opinion's conclusion to the
contrary, the evidence in the record leaves no room for
doubt on this question.
It has been suggested that both public policy and
the constitutional right to the "free exercise" of religion
militate against the recognition of a duty of care in these
circumstances.

I cannot agree.

The "policy" considerations most often mentioned
are the possibilities that a duty of care "could deter those
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that
15

their private disclosures could subject them to involuntary
commitment to psychiatric facilities,* (Maj. opn. at p.
[typed opn. at p. 29]) or that such a duty could discourage
"private assistance efforts."
opn. at p. 30].)

(Maj. opn. at p.

Such concerns are unfounded.

[typed
The scope of

the duty contemplated is commensurate with the nontherapist
counselor's background and stated mission.

Unless he also

happens to be a licensed therapist, his duty in most cases
would not require disclosure of confidential communications,
but would simply require that he advise the counselee to
seek competent medical care.
Concerns about the possible exposure of counseling
"hot lines" or even well-meaning friends to liability, are
equally misplaced.

There is simply no meaningful

resemblance between such activities and the sort of
counseling relationship at issue here.
Finally, it is urged that the imposition of a duty
of care on defendants would unconstitutionally burden their
First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
There is no merit to this contention.
While the First Amendment bars the government from
"prohibiting the free exercise of religion," religiously
motivated conduct "remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society."

(Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310

U.S. 296, 303-304; accord Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn.
16

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1112-1113.)

However, it should be

noted that defendants here do not claim that their religious
principles prohibit resort to psychiatric counseling or the
use of antidepressant drugs, nor do they claim that their
religious beliefs prohibit a pastoral counselor from
advising a counselee to seek psychiatric care.

On the

contrary, the record shows that defendants not only
acquiesced in, but on occasion recommended such treatment.
Thus, defendants do not contend that a psychiatric
referral itself violates their religious beliefs.

They

contend, rather, that the imposition of tort law duties in
general creates an impermissible "burden" on religious
liberty.

Where the interest is sufficient, however, it is

well settled that government may as readily compel
religiously prohibited conduct as prohibit religiously
motivated acts.

(See United States v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S.

252, 261 [court upheld federal law requiring that Amish
violate the tents of their faith by participating in the
Social Security system]; Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905)
197 U.S. 11, 39 [court upheld law requiring the vaccination
of children despite parental religious objections].)
Accordingly, courts, including our own, have determined that
religious groups may be held liable in tort for their
actions (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra, 46 Cal.3d 1092),
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even where they occur in the context of religiously
motivated counseling.

(See, e.g., O'Neil v. Schuckardt

(Idaho 1986) 733 P.2d 693, 699-700 [church may be held
liable for invasion of privacy resulting from marital
counseling]; Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church (Pa. 1975)
341 A.2d 105, 107 [action for interference with marriage and
business relations permitted where church ordered "shunning"
of former member]; Carrieri v. Bush (Wash. 1966) 419 P.2d
132, 137 [court allowed action for alienation of affections
where church pastor counseled woman to leave her husband who
was "full of the devil11],)
Carrieri:

As the court explained in

"Good faith and reasonable conduct are the

necessary touchstones to any qualified [First Amendment]
privilege that may arise from any invited and religiously
directed family counseling, assistance, or advice."

(419

P.2d at p. 137.)
We need not go as far as these courts in
sanctioning tort recovery for conduct which was religiously
motivated.

The intrusion in this case (i.e., the duty to

advise a suicidal counselee to seek medical care) is
religiously neutral.

Defendants are not exposed to

liability for refusing to counsel contrary to their
religious beliefs or for affirmatively counseling in
conformity with their beliefs.
is relatively minimal.
18

Thus, the burden on religion

The governmental interest, on the other hand, is
compelling; society's interest in preserving the life of a
would-be suicide is as profound as its interest in
preserving life generally.

To this end, society surely may

require a pastoral counselor who invites and undertakes a
counseling relationship with an individual in whom he
recognizes suicidal tendencies, to advise that individual to
seek competent medical care.
Thus, I am persuaded, on the facts presented, that
defendants owed a minimal duty of care to Nally.

I am

equally persuaded, however, that defendants fulfilled their
duty.
The facts in this regard are adequately stated in
the majority opinion and need not be retold here.

Although

defendants were aware of Nally1s suicidal tendencies and
continued to offer counseling, they were also aware that he
had been hospitalized as a result of an earlier suicide
attempt, had seen a psychiatrist while in the hospital and
been given a strong antidepressant drug.

The record shows

that defendants were not only aware that Nally was under the
intermittent care of medical doctors, including a
psychiatrist, but affirmatively advised him on several
occasions to seek medical care.

Moreover, Nally's

psychiatrist, Dr. Hall, testified that he had examined Nally
in the hospital and had advised his parents to have him

19

committed.

Dr. Hall, however, refrained from initiating

involuntary commitment proceedings.
Therefore, as the trial court expressly found, the
evidence shows that defendants neither breached their duty
to Nally, nor contributed in any causally significant
respect to his suicide.S/

For these reasons, I conclude

that the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the judgment of
nonsuit and dismissal of the action.
Accordingly, I concur in this court's judgment.

KAUFMAN, J.
I CONCUR:
BROUSSARD, J.

2/
The absence of breach or proximate cause does not,
of course, preclude our holding that defendants nevertheless
owed a minimal duty of care. (See fn. 7, ante, at p.
[typed opn. at p. 11].)
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